Triple-Play in the USA: Infrastructure Pays Off

Introduction

In this note, we compare the recent performance of three US fixed operators who have adopted contrasting strategies and technology choices, AT&T, Verizon, and Comcast. We specifically focus on their NGA (Next-Generation Access) triple-play products, for the excellent reason that they themselves focus on these to the extent of increasingly abandoning the subscriber base outside their footprints. We characterise these strategies, attempt to estimate typical subscriber bundles, discuss their future options, and review the situation in the light of a “Deep Value” framework.

A Case Study in Deep Value: The Lessons from Apple and Samsung

Deep value strategies concentrate on developing assets that will be difficult for any plausible competitor to replicate, in as many layers of the value chain as possible. A current example is the way Apple and Samsung – rather than Nokia, HTC, or even Google – came to dominate the smartphone market.

It is now well known that Apple, despite its image as a design-focused company whose products are put together by outsourcers, has invested heavily in manufacturing throughout the iOS era. Although the first generation iPhone was largely assembled from proprietary parts, in many ways it should be considered as a large-scale pilot project. Starting with the iPhone 3GS, the proportion of Apple’s own content in the devices rose sharply, thanks to the acquisition of PA Semiconductor, but also to heavy investment in the supply chain.

Not only did Apple design and pilot-produce many of the components it wanted, it bought them from suppliers in advance to lock up the supply. It also bought machine tools the suppliers would need, often long in advance to lock up the supply. But this wasn’t just about a tactical effort to deny componentry to its competitors. It was also a strategic effort to create manufacturing capacity.

In pre-paying for large quantities of components, Apple provides its suppliers with the capital they need to build new facilities. In pre-paying for the machine tools that will go in them, they finance the machine tool manufacturers and enjoy a say in their development plans, thus ensuring the availability of the right machinery. They even invent tools themselves and then get them manufactured for the future use of their suppliers.

Samsung is of course both Apple’s biggest competitor and its biggest supplier. It combines these roles precisely because it is a huge manufacturer of electronic components. Concentrating on its manufacturing supply chain both enables it to produce excellent hardware, and also to hedge the success or failure of the devices by selling componentry to the competition. As with Apple, doing this is very expensive and demands skills that are both in short supply, and sometimes also hard to define. Much of the deep value embedded in Apple and Samsung’s supply chains will be the tacit knowledge gained from learning by doing that is now concentrated in their people.

The key insight for both companies is that industrial and user-experience design is highly replicable, and patent protection is relatively weak. The same is true of software. Apple had a deeply traumatic experience with the famous Look and Feel lawsuit against Microsoft, and some people have suggested that the supply-chain strategy was deliberately intended to prevent something similar happening again.

Certainly, the shift to this strategy coincides with the launch of Android, which Steve Jobs at least perceived as a “stolen product”. Arguably, Jobs repeated Apple’s response to Microsoft Windows, suing everyone in sight, with about as much success, whereas Tim Cook in his role as the hardware engineering and then supply-chain chief adopted a new strategy, developing an industrial capability that would be very hard to replicate, by design.

Three Operators, Three Strategies

AT&T

The biggest issue any fixed operator has faced since the great challenges of privatisation, divestment, and deregulation in the 1980s is that of managing the transition from a business that basically provides voice on a copper access network to one that basically provides Internet service on a co-ax, fibre, or possibly wireless access network. This, at least, has been clear for many years.

AT&T is the original telco – at least, AT&T likes to be seen that way, as shown by their decision to reclaim the iconic NYSE ticker symbol “T”. That obscures, however, how much has changed since the divestment and the extremely expensive process of mergers and acquisitions that patched the current version of the company together. The bit examined here is the AT&T Home Solutions division, which owns the fixed-line ex-incumbent business, also known as the merged BellSouth and SBC businesses.

AT&T, like all the world’s incumbents, deployed ADSL at the turn of the 2000s, thus getting into the ISP business. Unlike most world incumbents, in 2005 it got a huge regulatory boost in the form of the Martin FCC’s Comcast decision, which declared that broadband Internet service was not a telecommunications service for regulatory purposes. This permitted US fixed operators to take back the Internet business they had been losing to independent ISPs. As such, they were able to cope with the transition while concentrating on the big-glamour areas of M&A and wireless.

As the 2000s advanced, it became obvious that AT&T needed to look at the next move beyond DSL service. The option taken was what became U-Verse, a triple-play product which consists of:

  • Either ADSL, ADSL2+, or VDSL, depending on copper run length and line quality
  • Plus IPTV
  • And traditional telephony carried over IP.

This represents a minimal approach to the transition – the network upgrade requires new equipment in the local exchanges, or Central Offices in US terms, and in street cabinets, but it does not require the replacement of the access link, nor any trenching.

This minimisation of capital investment is especially important, as it was also decided that U-Verse would not deploy into areas where the copper might need investment to carry it. These networks would eventually, it was hoped, be either sold or closed and replaced by wireless service. U-Verse was therefore, for AT&T, in part a means of disposing of regulatory requirements.

It was also important that the system closely coupled the regulated domain of voice with the unregulated, or at least only potentially regulated, domain of Internet service and the either unregulated or differently regulated domain of content. In many ways, U-Verse can be seen as a content first strategy. It’s TV that is expected to be the primary replacement for the dwindling fixed voice revenues. Figure 1 shows the importance of content to AT&T vividly.

Figure 1: U-Verse TV sales account for the largest chunk of Telco 2.0 revenue at AT&T, although M2M is growing fast

Telco 2 UVerse TV sales account for the largest chunk of Telco 2 revenue at ATandT although M2M is growing fast.png

Source: Telco 2.0 Transformation Index

This sounds like one of the telecoms-as-media strategies of the late 1990s. However, it should be clearly distinguished from, say, BT’s drive to acquire exclusive sports content and to build up a brand identity as a “channel”. U-Verse does not market itself as a “TV channel” and does not buy exclusive content – rather, it is a channel in the literal sense, a distributor through which TV is sold. We will see why in the next section.

The US TV Market

It is well worth remembering that TV is a deeply national industry. Steve Jobs famously described it as “balkanised” and as a result didn’t want to take part. Most metrics vary dramatically across national borders, as do qualitative observations of structure. (Some countries have a big public sector broadcaster, like the BBC or indeed Al-Jazeera, to give a basic example.) Countries with low pay-TV penetration can be seen as ones that offer greater opportunities, it being usually easier to expand the customer base than to win share from the competition (a “blue ocean” versus a “red sea” strategy).

However, it is also true that pay-TV in general is an easier sell in a market where most TV viewers already pay for TV. It is very hard to convince people to pay for a product they can obtain free.

In the US, there is a long-standing culture of pay-TV, originally with cable operators and more recently with satellite (DISH and DirecTV), IPTV or telco-delivered TV (AT&T U-Verse and Verizon FiOS), and subscription OTT (Netflix and Hulu). It is also a market characterised by heavy TV usage (an average household has 2.8 TVs). Out of the 114.2 million homes (96.7% of all homes) receiving TV, according to Nielsen, there are some 97 million receiving pay-TV via cable, satellite, or IPTV, a penetration rate of 85%. This is the largest and richest pay-TV market in the world.

In this sense, it ought to be a good prospect for TV in general, with the caveat that a “Sky Sports” or “BT Sport” strategy based on content exclusive to a distributor is unlikely to work. This is because typically, US TV content is sold relatively openly in the wholesale market, and in many cases, there are regulatory requirements that it must be provided to any distributor (TV affiliate, cable operator, or telco) that asks for it, and even that distributors must carry certain channels.

Rightsholders have backed a strategy based on distribution over one based on exclusivity, on the principle that the customer should be given as many opportunities as possible to buy the content. This also serves the interests of advertisers, who by definition want access to as many consumers as possible. Hollywood has always aimed to open new releases on as many cinema screens as possible, and it is the movie industry’s skills, traditions, and prejudices that shaped this market.

As a result, it is relatively easy for distributors to acquire content, but difficult for them to generate differentiation by monopolising exclusive content. In this model, differentiation tends to accrue to rightsholders, not distributors. For example, although HBO maintains the status of being a premium provider of content, consumers can buy it from any of AT&T, Verizon, Comcast, any other cable operator, satellite, or direct from HBO via an OTT option.

However, pay-TV penetration is high enough that any new entrant (such as the two telcos) is committed to winning share from other providers, the hard way. It is worth pointing out that the US satellite operators DISH and DirecTV concentrated on rural customers who aren’t served by the cable MSOs. At the time, their TV needs weren’t served by the telcos either. As such, they were essentially greenfield deployments, the first pay-TV propositions in their markets.

The biggest change in US TV in recent times has been the emergence of major new distributors, the two RBOCs and a range of Web-based over-the-top independents. Figure 2 summarises the situation going into 2013.

Figure 2: OTT video providers beat telcos, cablecos, and satellite for subscriber growth, at scale

OTT video providers beat telcos cablecos and satellite for subscriber growth at scale

Source: Telco 2.0 Transformation Index

The two biggest classes of distributors saw either a marginal loss of subscribers (the cablecos) or a marginal gain (satellite). The two groups of (relatively) new entrants, as you’d expect, saw much more growth. However, the OTT players are both bigger and much faster growing than the two telco players. It is worth pointing out that this mostly represents additional TV consumption, typically, people who already buy pay-TV adding a Netflix subscription. “Cord cutting” – replacing a primary TV subscription entirely – remains rare. In some ways, U-Verse can be seen as an effort to do something similar, upselling content to existing subscribers.

Competing for the Whole Bundle – Comcast and the Cable Industry

So how is this option doing? The following chart, Figure 3, shows that in terms of overall service ARPU, AT&T’s fixed strategy is delivering inferior results than its main competitors.

Figure 3: Cable operators lead the way on ARPU. Verizon, with FiOS, is keeping up

Cable operators lead the way on ARPU. Verizon, with FiOS, is keeping up

Source: Telco 2.0 Transformation Index

The interesting point here is that Time Warner Cable is doing less well than some of its cable industry peers. Comcast, the biggest, claims a $159 monthly ARPU for triple-play customers, and it probably has a higher density of triple-players than the telcos. More representatively, they also quote a figure of $134 monthly average revenue per customer relationship, including single- and double-play customers. We have used this figure throughout this note. TWC, in general, is more content-focused and less broadband-focused than Comcast, having taken much longer to roll out DOCSIS 3.0. But is that important? After all, aren’t cable operators all about TV? Figure 4 shows clearly that broadband and voice are now just as important to cable operators as they are to telcos. The distinction is increasingly just a historical quirk.

Figure 4: Non-video revenues – i.e. Internet service and voice – are the driver of growth for US cable operators

Non video revenues ie Internet service and voice are the driver of growth for US cable operatorsSource: NCTA data, STL Partners

As we have seen, TV in the USA is not a differentiator because everyone’s got it. Further, it’s a product that doesn’t bring differentiation but does bring costs, as the rightsholders exact their share of the selling price. Broadband and voice are different – they are, in a sense, products the operator makes in-house. Most have to buy the tools (except Free.fr which has developed its own), but in any case the operator has to do that to carry the TV.

The differential growth rates in Figure 4 represent a substantial change in the ISP industry. Traditionally, the Internet engineering community tended to look down on cable operators as glorified TV distribution systems. This is no longer the case.

In the late 2000s, cable operators concentrated on improving their speeds and increasing their capacity. They also pressed their vendors and standardisation forums to practice continuous improvement, creating a regular upgrade cycle for DOCSIS firmware and silicon that lets them stay one (or more) jumps ahead of the DSL industry. Some of them also invested in their core IP networking and in providing a deeper and richer variety of connectivity products for SMB, enterprise, and wholesale customers.

Comcast is the classic example of this. It is a major supplier of mobile backhaul, high-speed Internet service (and also VoIP) for small businesses, and a major actor in the Internet peering ecosystem. An important metric of this change is that since 2009, it has transitioned from being a downlink-heavy eyeball network to being a balanced peer that serves about as much traffic outbound as it receives inbound.

The key insight here is that, especially in an environment like the US where xDSL unbundling isn’t available, if you win a customer for broadband, you generally also get the whole bundle. TV is a valuable bonus, but it’s not differentiating enough to win the whole of the subscriber’s fixed telecoms spend – or to retain it, in the presence of competitors with their own infrastructure. It’s also of relatively little interest to business customers, who tend to be high-value customers.

 

  • Executive Summary
  • Introduction
  • A Case Study in Deep Value: The Lessons from Apple and Samsung
  • Three Operators, Three Strategies
  • AT&T
  • The US TV Market
  • Competing for the Whole Bundle – Comcast and the Cable Industry
  • Competing for the Whole Bundle II: Verizon
  • Scoring the three strategies – who’s winning the whole bundles?
  • SMBs and the role of voice
  • Looking ahead
  • Planning for a Future: What’s Up Cable’s Sleeve?
  • Conclusions

 

  • Figure 1: U-Verse TV sales account for the largest chunk of Telco 2.0 revenue at AT&T, although M2M is growing fast
  • Figure 2: OTT video providers beat telcos, cablecos, and satellite for subscriber growth, at scale
  • Figure 3: Cable operators lead the way on ARPU. Verizon, with FiOS, is keeping up
  • Figure 4: Non-video revenues – i.e. Internet service and voice – are the driver of growth for US cable operators
  • Figure 5: Comcast has the best pricing per megabit at typical service levels
  • Figure 6: Verizon is ahead, but only marginally, on uplink pricing per megabit
  • Figure 7: FCC data shows that it’s the cablecos, and FiOS, who under-promise and over-deliver when it comes to broadband
  • Figure 7: Speed sells at Verizon
  • Figure 8: Comcast and Verizon at parity on price per megabit
  • Figure 9: Typical bundles for three operators. Verizon FiOS leads the way
  • Figure 12: The impact of learning by doing on FTTH deployment costs during the peak roll-out phase

Mobile TV: going ‘Round The Side’ of telco networks?

Summary: Dyle TV, a new mobile TV broadcast network (supported by Fox), was presented at the Silicon Valley Brainstorm against the backdrop of Cisco’s VNI (Visual Networking Index) research on forecast growth in mobile video traffic. It was argued that Dyle’s model can both take the pressure off mobile operator data capacity by taking video traffic ‘round the side’ and make good use of TV Broadcasters’ spectrum. Could this model work, not only in the US but elsewhere around the world? (May 2012, Executive Briefing Service)

Dyle Mobile TV Image Telco 2.0

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Background

This is an extract of the analysis of a session at the Digital Entertainment 2.0 stream of the Silicon Valley New Digital Economics Executive Brainstorm, that took place on the 28th March, 2012. Using a widely acclaimed interactive format called ‘Mindshare’, the Digital Entertainment 2.0 stream enabled specially-invited senior executives from across the communications, entertainment and technology sectors to discuss and explore key strategic issues on the theme of ‘New Business Models in a multi-screen, 3D/HD, mobile world’. Presentations from the event can be found here and further STL Partners research on entertainment and content can be found here.

Mobile Video: How to Reduce Complexity

The hypothesis explored at this session (one of three) was that content owners and carriers want to deliver live video content to their customers but face significant barriers: hundreds of device types, various network conditions, bandwidth congestion, hundreds of simultaneous sessions, and a painful workflow.

Key questions:

  • How are new devices, formats and enabling technologies improving the situation?
  • What use cases are most compelling – for different markets, in different geographies?
  • What are the viable cost models? 
 
Presenters and Panellists:
  • Chris Osika, Senior Director IBSG, Cisco Systems presented an overview of Cisco’s VNI study of the future impact of video on communications networks;
  • Erik Moreno, SVP, Corporate Development, Fox Networks Group, presented on Dyle TV, a new innovation in Mobile TV in the US market; 
  • Andre James, Partner, Media Practice, Bain, also joined the panel.

The session was hosted and moderated by Andrew Collinson, Research Director, STL Partners. This Briefing summarises some of the high-level findings and includes the verbatim output of the brainstorm.

Stimulus presentations

Cisco’s VNI Study

Opening the session, Chris Osika, Senior Director IBSG, Cisco Systems, gave some background to mobile broadband data growth and especially video traffic, citing Cisco’s own VNI (Visual Networking Index) forecasts. As well as a summary of top-level findings below, here is a video of his presentation in full.

 

He covered changing end-user behaviours and business models in the TV and video sectors, citing tablets, multi-tasking and “TV Everywhere” services as catalysts of change, and you can see a video of this presentation below.

Figure 1 – Cisco VNI forecast growth of mobile data traffic

Mobile TV 'Round the Side' Telco 2.0 image

Source: Cisco
[Note: STL Partners will shortly be issuing its own analysis of the new Cisco VNI mobile data forecasts]

Counter-intuitively, he disagreed with part of the central notion of “Social TV”, stating that while consumers might use two devices simultaneously, it will likely be for two different experiences, not a single converged one. He also touched on the risks of video “breaking the network”, and subtly introduced the idea of using WiFi for offload, suggesting that this might be part of a service provider’s arsenal (rather than driven by the user, as is currently typical).

Figure 2 – Adoption of tablets & other examples of new consumer behaviour

Mobile TV 'Round the Side' Telco 2.0 image Fig 2

Source: Cisco

Dyle TV

Next, Erik Moreno, SVP Corporate Development, Fox Networks Group, introduced Dyle, a new partnership for mobile TV which Fox is working on with partners such as Comcast/xfinity. (Currently, five out of the top 7 US broadcast networks are participating – excluding ABC and CBS at present). It intends to use existing broadcasting technology to provide live TV onto mobile devices (including tablets & automotive screens). In essence, this is another attempt to create a mobilised version of broadcast (this technology is called ATSC-MH), complete with new chipsets to be included into handsets, and apps to decrypt and play back content. 

Figure 3 – An introduction to the Dyle mobile TV business model & technology

Mobile TV 'Round the Side' Telco 2.0 image Fig 3

Source: Fox Networks

However, unlike previous misadventures in mobile TV (think DVB-H in Europe, and Qualcomm’s MediaFlo network in the US), this time Dyle might be able to exploit a changing consumer behaviour mindset about on-the-go content (e.g. on tablets), coupled with different economics to 3G/4G usage – i.e. no data caps – as well as smarter and more user-friendly devices. Also, initially Dyle will be free-to-air, rather than demanding upfront monthly subscriptions, which has proven a major obstacle for occasional users.

He discussed the complexities of getting the service to market, juggling 11 different partnerships, cutting deals with content publishers, obtaining the first ATSC-MH integrated handset (from Samsung), starting build-out in 32 initial markets, gaining a distribution deal with MetroPCS and outlining its future roadmap such as an iPad antenna accessory from Belkin.

Figure 4 – Dyle mobile TV form-factors

Mobile TV 'Round the Side' Telco 2.0 image Fig 4

Source: Dyle

He sees four potential future revenue streams

  • Direct to consumer, which he thinks is “hard”
  • Wrapped up into MVPD services from cable companies wanting to offer TV Everywhere propositions
  • Targeted advertising – potentially location-based as well as individualised.
  • Distributed as an add-on to telcos’ voice and data plans

Figure 5 – Dyle has multiple business & distribution models

Mobile TV 'Round the Side' Telco 2.0 image Fig 5

Source: Fox Networks

Mr Moreno said that for mobile, “IP networks don’t scale” – especially for multiple viewers of live TV in the same location.

As part of the business rationale for Dyle, STL Partners thinks that it could help the TV industry justify continued ownership of spectrum in the face of a concerted effort by the telecoms industry to push regulators to repurpose it for mobile broadband.

To read this report in full, including…

  • Background
  • Mobile Video: How to Reduce Complexity
  • Stimulus presentations
  • Cisco’s VNI Study
  • Dyle TV
  • Panel Discussion & Delegate Input
  • Audience Q&As on presentations
  • Panel Discussion
  • Will Dyle work in the US and elsewhere? (Votes by region)
  • Verbatim delegate questions
  • What are the compelling mobile device video use cases? 
  • Conclusions and next steps
  • Key takeaways
  • Next steps

… and the following figures….

  • Figure 1 – Cisco VNI forecast growth of mobile data traffic
  • Figure 2 – Adoption of tablets & other examples of new consumer behaviour
  • Figure 3 – An introduction to the Dyle mobile TV business model & technology
  • Figure 4 – Dyle mobile TV form-factors
  • Figure 5 – Dyle has multiple business & distribution models
  • Figure 6 – Vote on Dyle model in the US
  • Figure 7 – Vote on Dyle model in Europe
  • Figure 8 – Vote on Dyle model in Asia

Members of the Telco 2.0 Executive Briefing Subscription Service can download the full 24 page report in PDF format hereNon-Members, please subscribe here, buy a Single User license for this report online here for £595 (+VAT for UK buyers), or for multi-user licenses or other enquiries, please email contact@telco2.net / call +44 (0) 207 247 5003.

Key terms referenced: Cisco, Dyle. Mobile TV, mobile operators, telcos, US, Europe, Asia, MediaFlo, VNI.

CDN 2.0: Report and analysis of the event

CDN 2.0: Event Summary Analysis. A summary of the findings of the CDN 2.0 session, 10th November 2011, held in the Guoman Hotel, London

CDN 2.0: A Summary of Findings of the CDN 2.0 Session Presentation

Part of the New Digital Economics Executive Brainstorm
series, the CDN 2.0 session took place at the Guoman Hotel, London on the 10th
November and looked at the future of online video, both the star product telcos
rely on for much of their revenue and the main driver of their costs.

Using a widely acclaimed interactive format called ‘Mindshare’, the event enabled
specially-invited senior executives from across the communications, media,
banking and technology sectors to discuss the field of content delivery
networking and the digital logistics systems Netflix, YouTube and other online
video providers rely on.

This note summarises some of the high-level
findings and includes the verbatim output of the brainstorm.

More information: email contact@stlpartners.com, or phone: +44 (0) 207 247 5003.

DOWNLOAD REPORT


Extracted example slide:

CDN 2.0: A Summary of Findings of the CDN 2.0 Session Presentation

Online Video Distribution Market Study

Options and Opportunities for Distributors in a time of massive disruption


Summary:
As online video challenges traditional distribution models, both old and new suppliers are pushing into the value chain in the hope of grabbing a share of the emerging global market. But how will the market develop and which companies will be the ultimate winners?

STL Partners has analysed the potential of online video, identified possible market winners and losers, and set out three interlocking scenarios depicting the evolution of the market. In each scenario, the role of distributors is examined, possible threats and opportunities revealed, and strategic options are discussed. (March 2009)

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Read in Full (Members only)   To Subscribe click here

This report is now availalable to members of our Telco 2.0 Research Executive Briefing Service. Below is an introductory extract and list of contents from this strategy Report that can be downloaded in full in PDF format by members of the executive Briefing Service here. 

For more on any of these services, please email contact@telco2.net/ call +44 (0) 207 247 5003 

Key Points

  • Market background, size and dynamics
  • Differences in, and lessons from, different geographies
  • Analysis of prospects by content type: movies, sport, music, adult and user-generated
  • Hulu Vs YouTube: Comparative business model analysis
  • Market forecasts for revenues related to online and mobile video
  • Evolving market scenarios
  • Positioning to maintain / develop advantages in scenarios
  • Recommends specific short, medium and long term actions for moving forward

Who is this report for?

The study is an invaluable guide to managers across the TV and video value chain who are seeking insight into how the online market will develop and the opportunities and threats it presents.

CxOs, Strategists, Product Managers, Investors, Operational Managers in Telecom’s Operators, Broadband Service Providers and ISPs, Media Companies, Content Aggregators and Creators.

Key Questions Answered

  • How will the online video market develop and what are the implications for value chain players?
  • Are there historical lessons (from cinema and TV) from which to learn?
  • Which content categories will be most affected by the shift online?
  • What is the best strategy for distributors and aggregators to maximise chances of success?

Background – Online Video: the Growing Bulge in the Fat Pipe

All recent data point towards video being the fastest growing segment of all internet traffic and the trend looks set to continue for the foreseeable future. This is true whichever metric is used: absolute number of viewers, total time spent viewing, data traffic volumes.

Growth is not limited to a content category: adult, sports, movies and music are all rapidly moving online. The internet has also led to a completely new category: User Generated Content – home movies have moved out of the privacy of the living room and are becoming more and more professional.

Growth is also not limited to a specific geography: the movement online is a worldwide phenomenon. The internet has no respect for traditional geographies and boundaries.

Overall, the evidence points towards a future where the internet will be a critical distribution channel for all forms of video.

The New Distribution is disruptive and no longer centrally controlled

Innovation in Video Distribution is nothing new and over the last century we have seen cinema, broadcast networks and physical media creating temporary shocks to older methods of distributing content – but the older methods survive.

However, there is only a certain amount of time in the day available for entertainment in general and watching video specifically. Legacy distribution channels are understandably worried about whether video online will be additive to or cannibalise their audiences, and our survey respondents largely share this view.

More Growth + Less Control = More Unpredictability

Positively, individuals have generated their own content and made it available to the world. Negatively, some individuals have used interactivity to distribute content without regard of the rights of the copyright holders. Copyright holders have struggled to enforce their rights. Illegal distribution of content not only threatens the absolute value of content, but has lead to unpopular and complicated mechanisms to protect content.

The absolute volume growth has also placed the internet access providers under severe strain: attempting to increase prices to compensate for the growth in traffic and gain extra revenue through developing additional services is proving very difficult.

These forces have generated a considerable amount of experimentation in the market especially in the area of pricing models: subscription, pay-as-you-go, advertising funded, bundles with other distribution channels and offset/subsidy – all exist in a variety of forms.

How & why is the current model broken?

The net result is the video market is in a state of flux and increasing tension as key players explore their positions. Will order emerge from the chaos? In what form will this new order take? What will be impact on the existing players in the video value chain? And, will powerful new players emerge?

How can it be fixed?

We believe that Video Distribution on the internet will reshape the value chain and the current forces point towards great uncertainty in the short term. In these circumstances, the key step is to explore possible future scenarios to assess their viability and robustness in the face of change.

Case Studies, Companies and Services, and Technologies & Applications Covered

Case Studies: Apple, Hulu, Phreadz, YouTube.

Companies and Organisations Covered: 3 UK, AllOfMP3.com, Amazon, AOL Music, Apple, Babelgum, Barnes & Noble, BBC, BBC iPlayer, Bebo, Bit Torrent, Black Arrow, BlipTV, Blockbuster, BT, BT Openreach, BT Vision, Comscore, Del.icio.us, Deutsche Telecom, Deutsches Forschungsnetz (DFN), Diggnation, Digital Entertainment Content Ecosystem (DECE), eMarketer, EMI, European Union, Eurosat, Facebook, Flickr, Flickr, Forbes, Frost & Sullivan, Gartner, Google, Hanaro, Hitwise, Hulu, iBall, IBM, Imagenio, International Movie Database (IMDB), Joost, KDDI, Korea Times, KT+A94, Lenovo, London Business School, MGM, Mobilkom Austria, Mobuzz, MP3Sparks, MSN Music, MTV, MySpace, Napster, National Information Society Agency (NISA), NBC, Net Asia Research, Netflix, NewTeeVee, NicoNicoDouga, Nielsen SoundScan, Nintendo, Now, NTT DoCoMo, Ofcom, Orange, Phorm, Phreadz, Powercomm, Qik, Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), Revision 3, Screen Digest, Seesmic, Seskimo, Silicon Valley Insider, Sky, Softbank, Sony, The Guardian, T-Mobile, Tremor Media, UK Football Premier League, Verizon, Video Egg, Virgin Media, Vivid, Walmart, Web Marketing Guide, Wikipedia, World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), Yahoo, YouPorn, YouTube.

Technologies & Applications Covered: 3G, 3GP, AAC, Adobe Flash, AMR, Android, Apple Quicktime, Apple TV, AVI, Batrest, BBC iPlayer, Beacon, Betamax, Broadband, CD, Cinema, DivX, DOCSIS 2.0, DOCSIS 3.0, DRM, DSL, DVD, Ethernet to the home, Fibre to the home, Final Cut HD/Pro/Studio, FLV, FON WLAN, Fring, GIF, H.264, H.264/AVC, HSDPA, iDVD, iMovie, Iobi, IP, iPhone, iPod, IPTV, iTunes, JPEG, Linux, MOV, MP3, MP4, MPEG, MPEG-2 SD, MPEG4, MPEG-4, NVOD, OGG, P2P, PAL, PNG, PopTab, P2P, RM, RMVB, Scopitones, Sky +, Slingbox, Soundies, TiVo, TV, VCR, VHS, Video over IP, VOB, VOD, WiFi, W-LAN, WMV, XviD.

Markets Covered and Forecasts Included

Markets Covered: Global, US, Canada, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Spain, Sweden, Finland, Japan, South Korea.

Forecasts Included: Online Video Vs Cinema & TV 2012, Global TV, Video and Cinema to 2018, Online Video Subscription and Advertising Revenues, Pro-Tail content advertising forecasts, Mobile TV and Video 2013.

Summary of Contents

  • Introduction
  • Executive summary
  • Part 1: Online video – the situation today
  • Part 2: Future scenarios
  • Part 3: Evolution of specific media genres
  • Part 4: Mobile evolution
  • Part 5: Geographical differences

The Research Process

The research evaluates the likelihood of three scenarios: Old Order Restored, Pirate World and New Players Emerge. Each of which paints a picture of the future entertainment industry in terms of: technology developments; consumer behaviour; service uptake and usage.

The research is based on comprehensive literature reviews, industry research and interviews with key staff from relevant organizations that shed insight on the needs and dynamics of the key players. Key Case Studies bring the story to life and provide a context for both successes and failures. An economic model of the resultant value chain is produced for each of the scenarios with analytical commentary.

Research Format
  • 130+ page manuscript document

This report is now availalable to members of our Telco 2.0 Research Executive Briefing Service. Below is an introductory extract and list of contents from this strategy Report that can be downloaded in full in PDF format by members of the executive Briefing Service here.  To order or find out more please email contact@telco2.net, call +44 (0) 207 247 5003.